



Naval power played an extremely important and often vital role in the lives of many 
maritime nations. This is not going to change in the future. Its influence is felt both 
in time of peace and in time of war. Naval power is one of the key factors in deterring 
a strong opponent from going to war. In case of war, naval power is a prerequisite for 
successful conduct of operations on land. And the final outcome of a war is invariably 
on land; it is there where the humans live. Naval power also plays a critical role across 
the spectrum of operations short of war. 
The range of threats in the maritime domain is broad. The conventional threats in 
peacetime include claims of the riparian states in regard to the boundaries of the 
economic exclusion zone (EEZ) and activities there, the extent of the territorial waters 
and the rights of innocent passage, and illicit fishing.
Navies and coast guards can be employed in routine activities in peacetime, operations 
short of war, low-intensity conflict, and high-intensity conventional war. Today and 
for the immediate future, naval forces will be predominantly employed in carrying out 
multiple and diverse missions in what are arbitrarily called “operations short of war.” 
However, a navy, no matter how strong, cannot carry out all the missions alone but 
needs to proceed in combination with other elements of naval power, such as a coast 
guard. 
Naval power will continue to play a critical and perhaps vital role in protecting and 
preserving a nation’s interests at sea. This will especially be the case for countries 
such as the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and 
1  The article represents a revised version of the article originally published in the Joint 
Forces Quarterly, issue 50, 3d quarter 2008, pp. 8-17.






others whose prosperity and economic wellbeing depend on the free and uninterrupted 
use of the sea. Naval power is undoubtedly a powerful tool in support of foreign 
policy, military or theater strategy, and various peace operations. It is an integral 
part of homeland security. In concert with other sources of the country’s military and 
nonmilitary power, naval power has a large role in deterring the outbreak of large-
scale hostilities. Finally, in the case of a regional or global conflict, forces on land 
cannot ultimately succeed without secure use of the sea. Obtaining, maintaining, and 
exercising control of the oceans are objectives that cannot be accomplished without a 
strong and effective naval power.  
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Sažetak
Vojno-pomorska moć igrala je vrlo važnu i često vitalnu ulogu za pomorske države. 
To se neće mijenjati ni u budućnosti. Njen utjecaj osjeća se i u vrijeme mira i u 
vrijeme rata. Pomorska moć jedan je od ključnih čimbenika u odvraćanju snažnog 
protivnika od ulaska u rat. U slučaju rata, vojno-pomorska moć preduvjet je za 
uspješnu provedbu operacija na kopnu. Krajnji ishod rata postiže se, nepromijenjeno, 
na kopnu, ondje gdje ljudi žive. Vojno-pomorske operacije, isto tako, imaju kritičnu 
ulogu u cijelom spektru neratnih operacija.
Raspon prijetnji je u pomorskoj domeni širok. Konvencionalne prijetnje u vrijeme mira 
uključuju i zahtjeve država uz more, vezane za granice zaštićenog ekološko-ribolovnog 
pojasa, granice teritorijalnih voda, prava neškodljivog prolaska i nezakonitog ribolova. 
Ratne mornarice i obalna straža mogu biti angažirane na rutinskim aktivnostima u 




Danas i u skoroj budućnosti, vojno-pomorske snage bit će dominantno angažirane u 
višestrukim i različitim misijama u operacijama koje se arbitrarno nazivaju „neratne 
operacije”. Međutim, ratna mornarica, bez obzira na jačinu, ne može realizirati sve 
misije sama nego mora djelovati zajednički s drugim instrumentima vojno-pomorske 
moći, kao što je obalna straža.
Vojno-pomorska moć nastavit će igrati kritičnu i vjerojatno ključnu ulogu u zaštiti 
i očuvanju državnih interesa na moru. To će osobito biti slučaj s državama kao 
što su Sjedinjene Američke Države, Velika Britanija, Japan i Kina, kao i druge čiji 
prosperitet i ekonomsko blagostanje ovise o slobodnom i neometanom korištenju 
mora. Vojno-pomorska moć je, bez sumnje, snažan alat u potpori vanjske politike, 
državne vojne strategije ili strategije vojnog djelovanja u određenom prostoru, kao 
i različitih vojnih operacija. Ona je sastavni dio domovinske sigurnosti. U suglasju 
s drugim izvorima državne vojne i nevojne moći, vojno-pomorska moć igra veliku 
ulogu u odvraćanju izbijanja neprijateljstava velikih razmjera. Napokon, u slučaju 
regionalnog ili globalnog sukoba, kopnene snage ne mogu ostvariti konačnu pobjedu 
bez sigurne uporabe mora. Stjecanje, održavanje i provedba nadzora nad oceanima, 
ciljevi su koji se ne mogu postići bez snažne i učinkovite vojno-pomorske moći.
 Ključne riječi:
vojno-pomorska moć, neratne operacije, domovinska sigurnost, vanjska politika, 
potpora vanjskoj politici, borba protiv pomorskog terorizma, borba protiv piratstva, 
protupobunjeničke operacije, vojno-pomorska diplomacija prisile, prevencija kriza, 
krizno upravljanje, mirnodopske operacije, neregularni rat, konvencionalni rat 
visokoga intenziteta, nadzor mora, stjecanje nadzora mora, održavanje nadzora mora, 
provedba nadzora mora, uskraćivanje korištenja mora, osporavanje nadzora mora, 
vladanje prostorom baziranja/rasporeda, glavne vojno-pomorske operacije, vojno-
pomorske taktičke akcije
 Introduction
All too often, the terms naval power and sea power are used interchangeably. 
But naval power, properly understood, refers to a direct and indirect source 
of military power at sea. Obviously, the main components of a naval power 
are the navy, coast guard, and marines/naval infantry and their shore 
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establishment. The term sea power (coined in 1849) originally referred to 
a nation having a formidable naval strength. Today, this term’s meaning is 
much broader; it now describes the entirety of the use of the sea by a nation. 
Specifically, a sea (or maritime) power comprises political, diplomatic, 
economic, and military aspects of sea use2. 
Naval power played an extremely important and often vital role in the 
lives of many maritime nations. This is not going to change in the future. Its 
influence is felt both in time of peace and in time of war. Naval power is one 
of the key factors in deterring a strong opponent from going to war. In case 
of war, naval power is a prerequisite for successful conduct of operations on 
land. And the final outcome of a war is invariably on land; it is there where 
the humans live. Naval power also plays a critical role across the spectrum of 
operations short of war. This aspect of naval power is not always sufficiently 
well-known or explained well.
The Threat
The range of threats in the maritime domain is broad. The conventional 
threats in peacetime include claims of the riparian states in regard to the 
boundaries of the economic exclusion zone (EEZ) and activities there, the 
extent of the territorial waters and the rights of innocent passage, and illicit 
fishing. Conventional threats include irregular warfare such as insurgencies 
and the possibility of a high-intensity war in various parts of the world, such 
as the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, Korean Peninsula, or Taiwan Strait. In addition, 
unconventional threats in the maritime domain have dramatically increased 
in diversity and intensity since the early 1990s. They include transnational 
maritime terrorism and criminal networks involved in illicit trafficking in 
narcotics, humans, and weapons. Piracy is a growing problem in some parts 
of the world, particularly in Southeast Asia and off the east and west coasts 
2  Specifically, a sea power encompasses naval power plus all the nonmilitary aspects of 
the use of the sea, particularly merchant marine, ports/harbors, fisheries, shipyards/ship 
repair facilities and all maritime-related industries, oil/gas exploration, and marine-related 




of Africa. The combination of transnational maritime terrorism and piracy 
can seriously disrupt the flow of inter- national commerce. The potential 
impact of such threats on world peace and the global economy is enormous 
(Department of the Navy, 2006:p.9). There is also a growing danger to ports/
bases and coastal facilities/installations from ballistic missiles fired by a 
rogue state or even transnational terrorist groups.
The threat to port security has increased significantly in the past few decades 
due to the proliferation of platforms and weapons that can be used against 
ships and port facilities/installations. Uninterrupted maritime trade is one of 
the most critical factors for the prosperity of nations. The problem of security 
against terrorist attack is especially acute at ports located near strategic 
chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Gibraltar, Suez Canal, 
and Panama Canal. Large ports are especially vulnerable to various hostile 
acts because of the difficulties in providing full, around-the-clock protection. 
Currently, the greatest threat to the security of major ports is from terrorists, 
operating individually or in groups.
Navy’s Responsibilities
Navies and coast guards can be employed in routine activities in peacetime, 
operations short of war, and high-intensity conventional war (see table 1). 
Today and for the immediate future, naval forces will be predominantly 
employed in performing multiple and diverse missions in what are arbitrarily 
called “operations short of war.” However, a navy, no matter how strong, 
cannot carry out all the missions alone but needs to proceed in combination 
with other elements of naval power, such as a coast guard. 
In some cases, the coast guard is an integral part of the navy; in other cases, 
the two are separate. Optimally, a coast guard should be used primarily for 
maritime policing (or constabulary) duties in peacetime and for carrying out 
some combat missions in operations short of war and in a high-intensity 
conventional conflict. In the littorals, the air force and army might be 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A navy also has to interact and work closely with other elements of the 
country’s sea power - specifically, the merchant marine, shipbuilding 
industries, ocean technology enterprises, and deep-sea mining agencies. 
Additionally, navies need to cooperate closely with many government 
agencies. This, in turn, requires smooth and effective interagency 
cooperation. Additionally, naval forces and coast guards need to work with 
a large number of nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer 
organizations ashore.
Operations in Peacetime
The navies perform diverse missions in peacetime ranging from routine 
activities and homeland security to protection of the country’s economic 
interests at sea, enforcement of maritime treaties, and humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief (HA/DR). In general, routine duties include maritime 
border laws/customs enforcement, vessel traffic control, hydrographic 
surveys, oceanographic research, salvage, search and rescue, ordnance 
disposal, and marine pollution control. For the most part, these tasks are the 
responsibility of the coast guard, with naval forces employed in a supporting 
role.
The threats to homeland security from across the sea are increasing in both 
scope and lethality. Specifically, these threats include ballistic missiles, 
maritime terrorism, cross-border illegal immigration, illicit trafficking in 
narcotics, humans, and weapons, and maritime pollution.
The threat of ballistic missiles against ports/airfields and coastal installations/
facilities can be countered by creating sea based ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
systems, as the U.S. Navy is doing. BMD systems detect and destroy enemy 
aircraft and missiles by physically and electronically attacking bases, launch 
sites, and associated command and control systems. As part of homeland 
security, they are intended to provide defense against ballistic missiles 
in the terminal phase of their flight (Department of the Navy, 2006:p.22). 
Maritime terrorism has emerged as a formidable threat to both civilian 
and naval vessels. Large commercial ships are easy targets for determined 
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terrorists, and the value of these vessels and cargoes makes them attractive 
to both regional terrorist groups and international organizations that desire 
to disrupt the economic lifelines of the industrial world. Compounding the 
threat is the use of commercial vessels by criminals who are often allied with 
terrorists. Ports/anchorages and critical coastal facilities/installations are 
potentially exposed to attacks by terrorists. Security of ports encompasses 
a series of related actions and measures regarding safety of incoming ships 
and their cargo during transit on the high seas, through the 200-nautical-
mile (nm) EEZ, in the territorial sea (usually the 12-nm zone offshore), and 
in ports and their approaches. Hence, in a physical sense, three zones of 
maritime security exist: the international zone (foreign countries, high seas), 
the border/coastal zone (territorial sea plus EEZ), and the domestic zone 
(territorial sea plus ports and their approaches). International law fully 
applies in the international zone, while the country’s jurisdiction is exercised 
over all vessels, facilities, and port security in the domestic and border/
coastal zones.
Coast guards are largely responsible for protection of their countries’ EEZs. 
This broad task includes monitoring and surveillance of the fisheries, 
maritime safety, marine pollution reporting, and protection of marine 
mineral deposits and gas/oil deposits and installations. The navies are 
primarily responsible for protecting friendly commercial shipping outside 
of the EEZ.
A state or territory ruled or controlled by a radical regime and situated close 
to maritime trade chokepoints might attempt to harass shipping, requiring 
the response of naval forces. Protection of shipping requires coordinated 
employment of surface, air, and subsurface forces, as well as a suitable 
command organization both ashore and afloat. In general, protection 
of shipping should envisage preemptive or retaliatory strikes or raids 
against selected targets at sea or ashore. A major operation in protection 
of shipping would require the execution of a variety of missions to protect 
merchant vessels from unlawful attack in international waters. This can be 
accomplished through, among other things, the escort of merchant ships 
(sometimes of individual ships, for a specific purpose), coastal sea control, 
harbor defense, and mine countermeasures
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Blue water navies such as the U.S. Navy are sometimes involved in disputes 
with riparian states regarding the rights of innocent passage through 
international straits, or in contesting these states’ excessive claims regarding 
the extent of territorial waters. 
This requires the use of naval forces to ensure freedom of navigation and 
overflight. Normally, a riparian state may exercise jurisdiction and control 
within its territorial seas; international law, however, establishes the right of 
innocent passage of ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters. 
Passage is considered innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good 
order, or security of the coastal nation. In addition, freedom of navigation 
through international airspace for aircraft is a well-established principle of 
international law. Threats to air-craft through extension of airspace control 
zones beyond international norms, whether by nations or groups, can be 
expected to result in use of force acceptable under international law to rectify 
the situation.
Navies are currently extensively employed in enforcing international 
treaties that prohibit illicit trafficking in weapons and humans. Smuggling 
and trafficking in humans have increased worldwide in recent years. The 
problem is exacerbated by the ever increasing involvement of criminal gangs 
in such trade. Among other things, the smuggling of migrants by organized 
crime groups disrupts the established immigration policies of destination 
countries. It also involves human rights abuses; such trafficking is slavery in 
all but name. If a ship is engaged in this activity, it loses its right of innocent 
passage. In December 2000, the United Nations (UN) convention against 
organized crime was also related to the protocol to prevent, suppress, and 
punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children. This protocol 
generally justifies interdiction of commercial vessels on counter-trafficking 
grounds. It also encourages information sharing, interdiction training, and 
the development of tighter legislative authority to interdict and enforce 
documentary requirements on shipping (Knights, 2006:p.23). 
Piracy has posed a threat to all nations for as long as people have sailed 
the oceans. The international community has branded piracy as hostile to 
the human race and treats it as one of the few crimes over which universal 
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jurisdiction applies. Piracy is punishable by all nations wherever the 
perpetrators are found and without regard to where the offense occurred. 
It remains a serious threat to international commerce and safety and is on 
the increase in many parts of the world, but particularly in the waters of 
Southeast Asia and Africa. In Southeast Asia, commercial ships are especially 
vulnerable to piracy due to narrow waterways and countless small islands.
Navies are often involved in nonmilitary actions, such as providing 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and engaging in goodwill 
activities. The first broad task includes such actions as emergency medical 
assistance, large-scale evacuation of civilian populations, noncombatant 
evacuation, and refugee assistance. Emergency medical assistance often 
includes transporting civilians in need of medical help from or to relatively 
remote locations.
Operations Short of War  
The navies are also employed for conducting missions that very often require 
threat of or using a lethal force in the situations short of high-intensity 
conventional war. In one definition, operations short of war are described 
as the use or threatened use of military capabilities in combination with 
other sources of national power short of high-intensity conventional war. 
These operations include the threats of use or actual use of military forces 
in support of foreign policy, military (and/or theater) strategy, combating 
piracy, combating maritime terrorism insurgency and counter-insurgency 
(COIN), and peace operations, Navies are an ideal tool for providing support 
of foreign policy. Their main advantages are flexibility, mobility, and political 
symbolism. Naval forces have diverse capabilities that can be quickly 
tailored to the situation at hand. They are also largely self-sufficient and do 
not require extensive land support. Naval forces can be employed in support 
of the country’s diplomatic initiatives in peacetime and time of crisis, or for 
naval diplomacy actions aimed to create a favorable general and military 
image abroad, establish one’s rights in areas of interest, reassure allies 
and other friendly countries, influence the behavior of other governments, 
threaten seaborne interdiction, and, finally, threaten the use of lethal force. 
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Deployment of naval forces during times of tension or crisis to back up 
diplomacy and thereby pose an unstated but clear threat is an example of 
naval diplomacy, which can also help in coalition building.
Navies are generally much more effective than armies or air forces in terms 
of their international acceptability and capacity to make the desired impact. 
They can be used symbolically to send a message to a specific government. 
When a stronger message is required, naval diplomacy can take the 
form of employment of carefully tailored forces with a credible offensive 
capability, signaling that a much more capable force will follow, or it can 
give encouragement to a friendly country by providing reinforcement. The 
threat of the use of limited offensive action or coercion might be designed 
to deter a possible aggressor or to compel him to comply with a diplomatic 
demarche or resolution.
Naval forces are one of the most effective and flexible tools in applying 
coercive diplomacy (popularly called gunboat diplomacy), which is the use 
or threat of limited naval force aimed at securing advantage or averting loss, 
either in furtherance of an international dispute or against foreign nationals 
within the territory or jurisdiction of their own state. Coercive diplomacy is 
conducted both in peacetime and during operations short of war. Methods 
used are “show the flag,” retaliatory raids, rescue operations, or direct attack 
to achieve a specific military objective. Visits of warships to foreign ports are 
one of the most common methods of showing the flag. The aim of such visits 
can range from demonstrating continuing interest in the area to showing 
resolve in support of a friendly state against threats by a neighboring state. 
The ships then act as ambassadors. Normally, the main purpose of such 
visits is to make a favorable impression on the local populace. The degree to 
which a show of force can be introduced depends on the political message 
to be communicated. 
Sometimes it can be carried out as a warning to leaders or hostile states. At 
other times, a show of force by ships can act as a sign of reassurance and a 
token of support. For example, the United States sent a powerful signal of 
support to Turkey and Greece by sending the battleship USS Missouri (BB–
63) for a visit to Istanbul and Piraeus in April 1946. This was followed by a 
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visit of the aircraft carrier USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42) to Greece in 
September of the same year. Both countries were under enormous pressure 
from the aggressive policies of Moscow. The Soviets strongly supported the 
Greek communists in their civil war and issued demands to Turkey to grant 
a naval base in the Dodecanese Islands and joint control of the Turkish Straits 
(Berend, 1996:p.34; Knight, 1975:p.451). 
However, in some cases, a show of force has failed to achieve its intended 
objectives. For example, the employment of three U.S. aircraft carriers in 
the Sea of Japan after the intelligence ship USS Pueblo (AGER–2) with its 
83 crew members was captured off Wŏnsan in January 1968 apparently did 
not offer a great advantage to the United States in subsequent negotiations 
(Mobley, 2003: pp. 117–118). During the Third Taiwan Crisis (1995-1996), 
the Chinese conducted series of missile firings and exercises off the coast of 
Taiwan. However, that show of force only hardened the Taiwanese posture 
and forced the United States to deploy carrier groups into the Taiwan Strait 
in March 1996.
Naval forces can be used in conflict prevention/management. Conflict 
prevention includes diverse military activities conducted either unilaterally 
or collectively under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and aimed at either 
preventing escalation of disputes into armed conflict or facilitating 
resolution of armed violence. These actions range from diplomatic initiatives 
to preventive deployment of naval forces. For example, the main purpose 
of the forward presence of U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific, Arabian 
Sea, Persian (Arabian) Gulf, and Mediterranean is to prevent the outbreak 
of large-scale hostilities that might affect the national interests of the United 
States and its allies or friends. Naval forces deployed in forward areas should 
be of sufficient size and combat power to defeat opposing forces quickly and 
decisively.
Under the UN Charter, conflict prevention should be conducted with strict 
impartiality because all sides in a dispute have to agree to involve other 
countries as mediators. Naval forces can be deployed in the proximity of 
a country where hostilities threaten to break out. Aircraft carrier groups 
and amphibious task forces in particular have a greater chance of success 
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in disputes among nation-states than in ethnic conflict or civil war. To be 
effective, such a deployment should be accompanied by a clear willingness 
on the part of the international community to use overwhelming force if 
necessary. Otherwise, the preventive deployment of naval forces, regardless 
of size and capability, will rarely produce the desired effect.
Blue water navies play a critical role in providing support to national 
and military (or theater) strategy as a part of nuclear and/or conventional 
deterrence. Credible nuclear deterrence is based on adequate capability and 
the certitude that one nation can and will inflict unacceptable losses on an 
enemy who uses nuclear weapons first. Nuclear-powered ballistic missile 
submarines (SSBNs) are the most survivable component of the country’s 
nuclear forces triad. During the Cold War, these submarines conducted 
extensive patrols in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, in readiness to fire their 
sea-launched ballistic missiles. Sea based nuclear deterrent forces continue to 
have an important role in the nuclear deterrence posture of the United States, 
the Russian Federation, Britain, France, and the People’s Republic of China.
The use or threatened use of conventional forces is a critical element in 
conventional deterrence. Naval forces are highly suitable for conventional 
deterrence because of their high mobility and combat power. For a blue water 
navy, the main method of exercising conventional deterrence is the forward 
deployment of its striking forces. Among other things, forward deployed 
forces can considerably enhance a nation’s influence and prestige in a given 
sea area. Presence can greatly help coalition-building, enhance stability, and 
deter hostile actions against one’s interests. It also provides an initial crisis-
response capability.
Routine forward presence includes permanently based naval forces overseas 
and periodic deployment of naval forces in the case of crises, port visits, and 
participation in bilateral and multilateral training exercises. For example, 
deployment of powerful U.S. carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike 
groups in a certain region, such as the eastern Mediterranean or western 
Pacific, can send a powerful signal to enemies and friends alike in a crisis. It 
could prevent the outbreak of conflict, shape the security environment, and 
serve as a basis for regional peace and stability.
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The ability to deploy sea based air and missile defenses forward contributes 
to force self-protection, assured access, and the defense of other forward 
deployed forces. Forward deployed U.S. naval forces can provide protection 
against air and missile threats over a large area of a given maritime theater. 
Also, by engaging enemy ballistic missiles in the boost and midcourse stages 
of flight, homeland security is greatly enhanced.
Forward naval presence also creates prerequisites for obtaining and then 
maintaining sea control in certain parts of a maritime theater. A blue water 
navy should deploy sufficiently strong and combat-ready forces in the area 
of potential conflict. These forces should be concentrated in such numbers as 
to be capable of quickly achieving superiority over the potential opponent at 
sea. A coastal navy or a major navy operating within the confines of a narrow 
sea normally cannot obtain sea control without naval forces operating from 
a secure base of operations. In practical terms, this means that the degree of 
basing/deployment area control must ensure full protection of forces from 
all types of threats. 
Navies are extensively used in carrying out diverse tasks as part of security 
cooperation in a given maritime theater. Security cooperation in general is 
aimed to build defense relationships with international partners, promote 
cultural awareness and regional understanding, and enhance strategic access. 
Cooperative activities include assisting host nations in freeing or protecting 
their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency; assisting in 
training; combating illegal activities along their coastlines; and protecting 
economic infrastructure (Department of the Navy, 2006:p.18).
Navies are also extensively employed in combating piracy in certain parts of 
the world’s ocean. Piracy is a form of illegal belligerence. It is not identical to 
coastal raiding, unarmed theft from ships, maritime terrorism, and maritime 
aspects of insurgency. It was traditionally universally condemned both in 
customary international law and in treaty commitments. Piracy has been 
characterized in the past as hostis humani generis—the enemy of the human 
race. In general, the quickest and most decisive method of combating 
piracy would be to plan and execute a major naval/joint operation. Such 
an operation should not include only employment of one’s naval forces 
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but also forces of other services. Land-based aircraft can be employed for 
maritime reconnaissance/surveillance and for attacking pirate bases and 
facilities/installations ashore. Special operations teams can be used for 
diverse tasks ashore ranging from reconnaissance/surveillance to attack on 
pirate command posts, eliminating pirate leaders, and freeing hostages and 
captured ships. A small but highly mobile ground force can be used for raids 
against the pirate bases and basing areas. The actions of all forces taking 
part in a major counterpiracy operation must be conducted within the same 
operational framework; otherwise, they would result in a waste of sorely 
needed time and resources.
Combating maritime terrorism cannot be considered in isolation of the struggle 
against terrorism in general. Hence, it is only one, and not necessarily the 
most important task in the employment of one’s naval forces in operations 
short of war. In many cases, coast guard (or border guard) would be 
employed in conducting counter-terrorist missions within the country’s 
territorial waters. Not only maritime forces, but whenever possible forces of 
other sister services should be employed in countering maritime terrorism, 
this is especially the case in the littorals. Countering maritime terrorism is 
not a problem of a single country no matter how powerful it is, but of the 
international community as a whole. Hence, cooperation of many navies 
should be ensured though bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
Navies can be employed to carry out diverse tasks in support of an insurgency/ 
counterinsurgency. Missions include blockading the coast to prevent an influx 
of fighters and material to the insurgents; attacking insurgent concentrations 
in their operating areas or sanctuaries by using surface combatants and 
carrier-based aircraft; providing gunfire support to friendly troops ashore; 
and providing close air support, transport of friendly troops and material, 
and reconnaissance/surveillance. For example, from 1965 to 1970, the U.S. 
Navy conducted a blockade of South Vietnam’s 1,200-mile coastline in an 
effort to stop fighters and supplies from flowing by sea from North Vietnam 
to South Vietnam (Operation Market Time). As part of that effort, Operation 
Sea Dragon aimed to intercept and destroy the Vietcong’s waterborne 
logistics craft. The Navy’s riverine forces conducted Operations Game 
Warden and Sea Lord.
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Naval forces are most extensively used in support of peace operations, which 
are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term 
political settlement. These actions are conducted in conjunction with 
diplomacy as necessary to negotiate a truce and resolve a conflict. They may 
be initiated in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after the end 
of the hostilities. 
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are the principal types of peace 
operations. Peacekeeping operations are designed to contain, moderate, 
or terminate hostilities between or within states, using international or 
impartial military forces and civilians to complement political conflict-
resolution efforts and restore and maintain peace. These actions take place 
after the sides in a conflict agree to cease hostilities; impartial observers are 
normally sent to verify the implementation of the ceasefire or to monitor the 
separation of forces.
Peace-enforcement operations involve diverse tasks as authorized by 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The objective is to compel compliance with 
resolutions or sanctions that have been adopted to maintain or restore 
peace or order. The tasks of peace enforcement include implementation of 
sanctions, establishment and supervision of exclusion zones, intervention 
to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerents. The aim is to 
establish an environment for a truce or ceasefire. In contrast to peacekeeping 
operations, peace-enforcement operations do not require the consent of the 
warring factions involved in a conflict. When used for peace enforcement, 
naval forces should have at least limited power projection capabilities and 
be ready to engage in combat. 
Naval forces may also be involved in expanded peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement operations. These operations are larger than peacekeeping 
operations and can involve over 20,000 personnel. The consent of the 
sides in the conflict is usually nominal, incomplete, or nonexistent. These 
operations include more assertive mandates and rules of engagement, 
including the use of force under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Binnendijk, 
1996:p.135). Expanded peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations are 
conducted with strictly limited objectives, such as protecting safe-flight or 
59
On Naval Power
no-fly zones or relief deliveries. If too intrusive, the operations are likely to 
draw multinational forces into open hostilities; the naval forces would then 
have to be either pulled out or committed to full-scale combat (Binnendijk, 
1996:p.138).
The principal methods of combat employment of naval forces in operations short of 
war are major and minor tactical actions. Major naval operations are planned 
and conducted only in exceptional circumstances. One’s naval forces are 
largely employed as part of the sea and/or air exclusion zone and maritime 
intercept operations (MIOs). Exclusion zones can be established in the air, at 
sea, or on land to prevent the transit of oil or other cargo and weapons. 
An exclusion zone is usually imposed by the United Nations or some other 
international body, but it may also be established by individual countries. 
Exclusion zones can be authorized by UN Security Council resolution 
and offer a means of simplifying sea control through the promulgation of 
an intention to maintain sea denial to cover a specific area. In diplomatic 
terms, they are a way of enhancing coercive action by declaring a resolve to 
use combat if necessary. To be credible, they must be enforceable, and the 
rights and security of third parties need to be ensured. Maritime intercept 
operations are usually conducted as part of the enforcement of sanctions by 
an international body such as the UN or some regional body. The political 
objective is usually to compel a country or group of countries to conform to 
the demands of the initiating body. They include coercive measures aimed 
to interdict the movement of designated items into or out of a nation or a 
specific sea area. MIOs can also be applied by a major naval power or group 
of powers to prevent maritime terrorism or illicit trafficking in narcotics, 
humans, and weapons. Normally, these operations require the employment 
of both surface and air forces (Boyce, 1999:p.26). For example, UN-mandated 
MIOs were conducted against Iraq by the U.S. Navy and its coalition partners 




Navies will play a major role in providing direct and/or indirect support to 
ground forces in the case of a regional or global conflict. War at sea has almost 
never taken place alone but has been conducted in conjunction with war on 
land and, in the modern era, in the air. The objectives of naval warfare have 
been an integral part of war’s objectives. These, in turn, are accomplished by 
the employment of all the services of a country’s armed forces. In contrast 
to war on land, the objectives in war at sea are almost generally physical in 
character. 
The main objective for a stronger side is to obtain sea control in the whole 
theater or a major part of it, while the weaker side would try to deny that 
control. After desired degree of sea control is obtained, it must be maintained. 
In operational terms, this phase equates to consolidation of strategic or 
operational success. Exercising sea control is the ultimate purpose of the 
struggle for sea control by a stronger side at sea. In operational terms, it 
equates to exploitation of the strategic or operational success. Obtaining/
maintaining and exercising control are not clearly delineated in terms of the 
factors of space and time. In practice, a stronger side would start to exercise 
control while the efforts to obtain and maintain sea control are still under 
way. Sometimes, methods for obtaining and exercising sea control are 
applied simultaneously, as in the case of naval/commercial blockade.
The concept of sea control is at the same time both simple and complicated. 
In its simplest definition sea control can be described as one’s ability to use a 
given part of the sea/ocean and associated air (space) for military and nonmilitary 
purposes and deny the same to the enemy in time of open hostilities. However, 
this definition does not reflect that sea control exists in various states and 
degrees. Sea control implies sufficient and extensive control of a major 
part of a given maritime theater. It does not mean that all hostile ships, 
submarines, or aircraft are unable to operate. It only means that the enemy 
does not have significant capabilities to interfere seriously with one’s use 
of the sea for military and nonmilitary purposes. An ocean or sea area may 
be considered under control when one’s naval/air forces can operate freely 
and conduct seaborne traffic while the enemy cannot do the same except 
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at considerable risk. Control of a specific sea/ocean area ensures one’s 
naval forces exercise that control. At the same time, the weaker opponent is 
forced to contest control by conducting sporadic actions of limited duration 
(Cutts, 1938:pp.8, 4–5). In a typical narrow sea if a stronger side obtained sea 
control, the weaker side could make that control increasingly difficult and 
ultimately obtain control for itself. Even in the areas where a stronger side at 
sea possesses a substantial degree of control of the surface and subsurface, 
the weaker side can still operate under certain conditions provided that it 
enjoys air superiority (Poeschel, 1982:p.42). Sea control is obtained primarily 
by the employment of maritime forces in the form of major naval operations. 
In the littorals, these operations will be joint or combined—that is, not only 
naval forces but also combat arms/branches of other services will take part.
In strategic terms, obtaining or losing sea control on the open ocean would 
normally have an indirect effect on the war situation on land. This effect is 
far more direct and immediate in enclosed or marginal seas, where in many 
cases the loss of sea control can lead to the collapse of one’s front on land 
and thereby considerably affect the outcome of the war. The opposite is also 
true: obtaining or losing sea control in a marginal sea or enclosed seas is 
considerably influenced by the course of events in the war on land (Poeschel, 
1982:p.41). In contrast to the open ocean, sea control in a typical narrow 
sea usually cannot be obtained and then maintained without the closest 
cooperation among all the services. Even when the navy is the principal 
force, it should be directly or indirectly supported by the other services. Very 
often, naval forces would have a relatively higher degree of independence in 
carrying out tasks to obtain sea control (Poeschel, 1982:p.41, 45). 
Sea control is inextricably linked with armed struggle at sea. In other words, 
one does not possess control of the sea by virtue of having forces deployed 
in the proximity of the area of potential conflict or crisis in peacetime. In 
peacetime, any navy, regardless of its size or combat strength, has almost 
unlimited access to any sea area. Forward presence is conducted with full 
respect for international treaties and conventions and without violating the 
territorial waters of other countries. Yet this does not in any way preclude 
starting the struggle for sea control in peacetime because preconditions must 
be created to quickly attain sea control after the start of hostilities (Poeschel, 
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1982:p.44). By obtaining sea control, the stronger side would create favorable 
conditions for carrying out other important tasks at sea. 
Sea control and disputed (or contested) sea control can be strategic, 
operational, and tactical in scale. Strategic sea control pertains to the 
entire maritime theater, while control of a major part of a maritime theater 
represents operational sea control. Tactical control refers to control of a 
maritime combat sector or zone but sometimes can encompass a maritime 
area of operations. However, in practical terms, the focus should invariably 
be on strategic or operational sea control or disputed control, not tactical sea 
control.
Sea control can encompass control of the surface, subsurface, and airspace or 
of any combination of these three physical media. In the era of sail, command 
of the sea was limited to command of the surface. After the advent of the 
submarine and aircraft, the two other dimensions emerged. The degree of 
overall control of a given sea area depends on the degree of control of each 
of the three dimensions (Poeschel, 1982:p.42). However, experience shows 
that, during war between two strong opponents at sea, it is not possible to 
obtain or maintain control of all three physical media to the same degree or 
for extended times.
Because of the rather large differences in the size of the physical environment 
and the proximity of the continental landmass, there is a considerable 
difference between obtaining sea control on the open ocean and in the littorals. 
Obtaining sea control in the littorals is highly dependent on the ability to 
obtain air superiority. Because of the ever-increasing range, endurance, and 
speed of modern aircraft, ever-larger ocean areas are becoming the areas of 
employment for both naval forces and land-based aircraft. Today, no part 
of the littoral is beyond the reach of land-based attack aircraft. Land- or 
carrier-based aircraft play an extraordinary role in obtaining sea control in 
the littorals. Without air superiority, sea control simply cannot be obtained. 
Depending on capabilities, naval forces can take part in the struggle for air 
superiority. Yet they are not the main means of accomplishing that objective, 
especially in the sea areas within effective range of land-based aircraft. If one 
side at sea possesses air superiority, it can be very difficult for the other side 
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to use some aspects of sea control for its own purposes. Air superiority over 
a given ocean area can compensate for those aspects of sea control that naval 
forces failed to obtain. Nevertheless, for all its value, air superiority cannot 
replace control of the surface and subsurface (Poeschel, 1982:p.43). 
In general, sea control cannot be expressed in quantitative terms or various 
metrics (as the U.S. Navy is trying to do); it can be recognized only in its 
effects. Sea control is always relative in spatial terms. It pertains to the specific 
part of the theater in which a certain degree of control must be obtained. Sea 
control is also relative in terms of the factor of time. It is also relative in terms 
of the factor of force. The relatively strong enemy always has the ability to 
dispute the sea control obtained by the stronger side (Poeschel, 1982:p.80). 
Exercising sea control is the ultimate purpose of the struggle for sea control by 
a stronger side at sea. In generic terms, the main methods in exercising sea 
control are defense/protection of friendly and destruction of the enemy’s 
maritime trade, amphibious landings on the opposed shore, destruction/
neutralization of the enemy forces and facilities/installations in the coastal 
area, and providing support to friendly ground forces in their offensive (or 
defensive) operations on the coast.
Disputed (or contested) sea control is usually the principal objective of a 
weaker but relatively strong navy in the initial phase of a war at sea. When 
command is in dispute, the general conditions might give a stable or 
unstable equilibrium. Then the power of neither side preponderates to any 
appreciable extent. It may also be that the command lies with the opponent 
(Corbett, 1918:p.91). The objective then can be strategic, encompassing the 
entire theater, or operational, when control is disputed in a major part of the 
theater.
Disputed sea control exists when the opposing sides possess roughly equal 
capabilities and opportunities to obtain sea control in a theater as a whole (or 
in one of its parts) and there is neither significant change in the ratio of forces 
nor a change of the initiative to either side (Poeschel, 1982:p.71). Once disputed 
control is obtained, the initially weaker side can possibly try to obtain sea 
control of its own. Denying the use of the sea to an opponent has often been 
regarded as the opposite of sea control, but this is an oversimplification. If 
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a weaker side denies control of the sea to a stronger opponent, this does 
not mean that it necessarily obtains control itself (Simpson, 1977:p.xix.). Sea 
control and sea denial are often complementary objectives. For example, sea 
denial may be conducted to help secure use of the sea, either in the same 
geographical area or elsewhere. A fleet operating in one or more enclosed or 
marginal seas might opt for, or be forced by circumstances to accomplish, a 
combination of objectives—general sea control in the enclosed sea theater, 
and contested control in a semi-enclosed sea or parts of the adjacent oceans.
Disputed sea control often occurs in the initial phase of a war and is 
characterized by an almost-continuous struggle for control of certain ocean 
areas. Once control is obtained, however, it is usually not maintained for a 
long period, but may be lost from time to time and then regained. In coastal 
or offshore waters, sea control by a stronger fleet can be disputed even if the 
major part of a weaker fleet is destroyed.
When control is in dispute, both sides usually operate at high risk because their 
strength is approximately in balance. One side usually controls one or more 
parts of a given theater, while its opponent controls the remaining part. Each 
side’s control of a specific sea area is usually limited in time. In the littorals, 
however, contesting sea control is primarily carried out by submarines, small 
surface combatants, coastal missile/gun batteries, land-based aircraft, and 
mines. In general, naval forces can carry out operations aimed to secure control 
of the sea areas, operations in areas not under command, and operations in 
the sea areas under command (Turner, 1938: p.8). 
A unique feature of the struggle for sea control in the narrow seas is control 
of the straits/narrows or chokepoint control.  The objective for a weaker 
side, then, is just the opposite: chokepoint control denial. In either case, but 
particularly for a weaker side, this objective would normally require the 
highest degree of cooperation among naval forces and the combat arms of 
other services.
The sea’s exits are critically important for control of the movements of naval 
forces and military/commercial shipping. They also often serve as the 
highways for large-scale invasions. Control of a strait/narrows or several 
straits can cut off or isolate enemy forces in an adjacent theater of war. The 
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loss of control of an important chokepoint on whose shores a land campaign 
is in progress is often fraught with danger for naval forces. For a major 
navy, general sea control is hardly possible without establishing not only 
control on the open ocean but also direct or indirect control of several critical 
passages of vital importance to the world’s maritime trade, or by obtaining 
control of a given narrow sea. 
Another operational objective for both the stronger and weaker sides at 
sea is to establish and maintain basing/deployment area control for their naval 
forces and aircraft, thereby creating prerequisites for planning, preparing, 
and executing naval/joint major operations. Without securing control 
of a basing and deployment area first, it is difficult if not impossible to 
prepare and execute major naval/joint operations and naval tactical actions. 
This objective is especially critical for naval forces operating in a typical 
narrow sea. Optimally, control of basing and deployment areas should be 
established and maintained in peacetime. It is an integral part of the theater-
wide or operational protections. The operational commander should be 
solely responsible for ensuring sufficient degree of basing/deployment area 
control.  
The principal elements of basing/deployment area control are coastal 
reconnaissance/surveillance, airspace control/air defense, missile defense, 
anti-combat craft defense, anti-submarine defense, defensive mining, 
offensive and defensive mine counter-measures, defense of naval bases/
ports and airfields, defense of the coast, defense and protection against 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), defense and protection of information 
systems, defense against terrorist acts, and cover and concealment. Basing/
deployment area control is accomplished through the series of tactical actions 
at sea, subsurface, air, and land. The operational objective is accomplished 
over time.
Control of basing/deployment area must be maintained and if possible 
expanded during a war. The physical scope of this control depends on the 
degree of sea control obtained in a given sea or ocean area. Without sea 
control, one cannot maintain control of basing/deployment areas. At the 
same time, actions to obtain sea control are far easier if forces operate from 
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secure basing and deployment areas. This, of course, does not preclude 
obtaining sea control in an area where control of basing and deployment 
areas does not exist. This is especially true in the operations of naval forces 
in enemy-controlled sea areas. Then the basing and deployment area is 
gradually extended by establishing new bases and facilities on the conquered 
territories (Poeschel, 1982:p.74).
Conclusion
As in the past, naval power will continue to play a critical and perhaps 
vital role in protecting and preserving a nation’s interests at sea. This will 
especially be the case for countries such as the United States, Great Britain, 
Japan, the People’s Republic of China, and others whose prosperity and 
economic wellbeing depend on the free and uninterrupted use of the sea. 
Naval power is undoubtedly a powerful tool in support of foreign policy, 
military or theater strategy, and various peace operations. It is an integral 
part of homeland security. In concert with other sources of the country’s 
military and nonmilitary power, naval power has a large role in deterring 
the outbreak of large-scale hostilities. Finally, in the case of a regional or 
global conflict, forces on land cannot ultimately succeed without secure use 
of the sea. Obtaining, maintaining, and exercising control of the oceans are 
objectives that cannot be accomplished without a strong and effective naval 
power.  
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